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ARE YOU SIMPLY SLEEPING YOUR WAY TO
THE TOP OR CREATING AN ACTIONABLE
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT?: A
CRITIQUE OF MILLER V. DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS IN THE TITLE VII CONTEXT
CHRISTINA

J. FLETCHERt

"Love Your Job? What About Your Boss?"1
INTRODUCTION

In today's work-obsessed and job-focused culture with ever
increasing time being spent at work, 2 office romances are
commonplace. 3 A recent New York Times article indicated that
fifty-eight percent of workers had dated a coworker, 4 and,
perhaps more shockingly, that fourteen percent had dated a
superior and nineteen percent had dated a subordinate. 5 While
t J.D. Candidate, June 2007, St. John's University School of Law; M.P.A., 2000,
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University; B.A., 1999,
College of Arts and Sciences, Syracuse University.
1 Title of a NEW YORK TIMES article discussing the Miller case and its
implications for workplace romance. Mireya Navarro, Love the Job? What About
Your Boss?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 9, at 1.
2 See Joanna Grossman, Can Consensual Workplace Sex Create a Hostile
Environment?, CNN.com, July 29, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/07/29
/grossman.workplace/index.html; Alyce H. Rogers, Employer Regulation of Romantic
Relationships: The Unsettled Law of New York State, 13 TOURO L. REV. 687, 687
(1997) (discussing the influx of women in the workplace and its impact on the rise of
workplace relationships).
3 See Paul C. Buchanan, Love, or Harassment?, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2001
at 8, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/bltseptOlbuchanan.html;
Navarro, supra note 1; Joan E. Van Tol, Eros Gone Awry: Liability Under Title VII
for Workplace Sexual Favoritism, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 153, 162-63 (1991) (stating
that workplace dating among supervisors and subordinates is frequent).
4 Navarro, supra note 1.
5 Id.; see also Billie Wright Dziech, Robert W. Dziech II & Donald B. Hordes,
'Consensual' or Submissive Relationships: The Second-Best Kept Secret, 6 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POLY 83, 87 (1999) (quoting a 1996 American Management
Association survey as finding that "[t]wenty-seven percent [of employees] reported
having had romantic relationships with colleagues. Of these, twenty-seven percent
described the 'romantic partner' as a subordinate, seven percent as a superior, and
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consensual sexual relationships in the workplace are certainly
not illegal 6 and not generally a target of workplace litigation, 7
substantial risks can arise when those relationships are between
subordinates and supervisors. 8 One potential risk is sexual
favoritism,9 which occurs when a supervisor provides preferential
job benefits to a subordinate with whom he is having a sexual
relationship. 10 The concept of sexual favoritism puts a twist on
traditional sexual harassment claims that might arise from a
workplace consensual relationship by expanding the claim
beyond those actually in the relationship to other individuals in
the workplace who claim they were affected by the relationship. 1
Courts and commentators have consistently disagreed over
whether workplace sexual favoritism that arises from a
supervisor's consensual sexual relationship with another
employee constitutes an actionable sexual harassment claim. 12
five percent as the 'boss.' ").
6 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(explaining that Title VII is not a "civility code" and not intended to make the
workplace "asexua[1]" or to prohibit socializing in the workplace).
7 Alan Orantes Forst, Love Beneath the (Docket) Sheets: Office Romance and
Sexual Discrimination Law, 73 FLA. B.J. 24, 31 (March 1999) (stating that
"[e]mployers and their attorneys need not fear Title VII liability based merely on a
consensual personal relationship (sexual or otherwise) between a supervisor and
subordinate"). But see Alison J. Chen & Jonathan A. Sambur, Are Consensual
Relationship Agreements a Solution to Sexual Harassment in the Workplace?, 17
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 165, 165-67 (1999) (asserting that a relationship is
consensual only so long as both sides believe that it is-it can quickly turn into a
non-consensual situation).
s Buchanan, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that "50 percent of sexual-harassment
lawsuits arise out of workplace relationships that started out as consensual," and
that "workplace romances can lead to other legal complications as well, including
perceptions of favoritism ... and conflicts of interest").
9 See Mitchell Poole, Paramours, Promotions and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair,
But Is There Liability?, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 822 (1998) (explaining that "[clases of
sexual harassment actionable under Title VII... are not always so easy to
distinguish from nonactionable cases of sexual favoritism, and employers are at risk
because of this vagary").
10 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 162. Generally sexual favoritism arises from a
consensual sexual relationship between a co-worker and a supervisor. Id.
11 The more typical sexual harassment claim that arises from a consensual
workplace relationship is a subordinate in a relationship which she claims she was
coerced into by the superior. A sexual favoritism claim, by contrast, is brought by a
co-worker of those in the relationship who claims she was disadvantaged in the
workplace due to the supervisor's favoritism towards his lover. See Van Tol, supra
note 3, at 161-62 (arguing that "sexual favoritism is another form of sexual
harassment" and that preferential treatment "undermines the integrity of the
workplace").
12 See Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual
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Recently, in Miller v. Department of Corrections,13 the
California Supreme Court unanimously held that consensual
sexual relationships that result in favoritism in the workplace
may constitute sexual harassment of employees who were not so
favored. 14
While this holding was touted as significantly
expanding the landscape of sexual harassment law, 15 the narrow
analysis employed by the Miller court appears to present
substantial barriers to victims of sexual favoritism and to depart
from the Supreme Court's teachings on sexual harassment in the
Title VII context.
In Miller, a situation arose that the court deemed
"outrageous"1 6 and commentators labeled "soap opera" worthy. 17
The events 8 occurred at prison facilities run by the state's
Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs Miller and Mackey were
correctional officers. Beginning in 1994, Miller heard from other
employees that the warden of the prison (Kuykendall) was
having a consensual sexual relationship with three different
women subordinates (Patrick, Brown, and Bibb).19 During the
time that the relationships occurred, Patrick, Brown, and Bibb
received various job benefits ranging from desirable transfers,
Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 559 n.68, 561 nn.73 & 74 (1994) (detailing
the many holdings of the various federal courts regarding sexual favoritism);

Michael J. Levy, Note, Sex, Promotions and Title VII: Why Sexual Favoritism Is Not
Sexual Discrimination,45 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 668 (1994); discussion infra Part II.

115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 90.
15 See discussion infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
media attention and legal community reaction to Miller).
16 Miller, 115 P.3d at 91.
17 David L. Hudson Jr., Sexual Hijinks Can Create Hostile Work Environment,
ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT (July 29, 2005); see also Mike McKee, Court Equates
Favoritism with Discrimination,THE RECORDER, July 19, 2005 (stating that "[tihe
decision comes out of a case that has all the tawdry elements of a cheap, made-forTV movie"); Stephen C. Tedesco & Jamie M. Harding, Employers Face Greater Risk
from Workplace Romance: California Supreme Court Rules that Office Affairs May
Give Rise to Sexual Favoritism Claims, ASAP: Littler Mendelson Newsletter, Aug.
2005, available at http://www.littler.com/collateral/12824.pdf (noting lurid details of
the case, including disputes between the lovers and the women "squabbl[ing]" over
the man at the workplace).
18 The events and facts from Miller will be discussed in some detail. This is
because, following the Supreme Court's guidance that sexual harassment claims
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, such cases are analyzed in a heavily
fact-specific manner. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (noting
that "whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances").
19Miller, 115 P.3d at 81.
13
14
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promotions for which there were better qualified candidates,
special assignments, and work privileges.2 0 While the warden
was the individual working behind the scenes to effectuate the
transfers and promotions, the three women bragged to coworkers
about their power over the warden. 2 1 Brown was able to win
numerous promotions over Miller, even though Miller had a
22
higher rank, superior education, and greater experience.
Within a year and a half, Brown was promoted to the position of
associate warden. Other employees were outraged at the pace of
her promotions and complained that to achieve higher-ranking
23
positions they would have to "F [their] way to the top."
Things got worse for Miller when Yamamoto, a female chief
deputy warden who was also rumored to be engaged in a sexual
relationship with Brown, began "interfer[ing] with [plaintiffs]
duties" including countermanding her orders, imposing upon her
24
additional onerous duties and threatening her with reprisals.
When Miller complained to the warden, he did nothing to
discipline Yamamoto and indicated that he was unable to help
Miller due to his relationship with Brown and Brown's
25
relationship with Yamamoto.
20 Id. at 82. The warden sat on the interview committees when these women
were up for promotions and, in one instance when the committee failed to select the
warden's lover, he told the members to "make it happen." Id. at 81.
21 Id. at 81-82. In one instance, plaintiff Miller competed for a promotion
against one of the warden's lovers (Brown). The lover announced to plaintiff that the
warden would be forced to give her the promotion or else "she would 'take him down'
with her knowledge of 'every scar on his body.'" Id. at 82.
22 Id. at 82. Plaintiff was afraid of complaining about the relationships because
she had witnessed adverse employment actions taken against two other employees
who had complained about the warden's affairs. Id.
23 Id. Brown's promotion to associate warden made her Miller's direct
supervisor. Id. The warden had again sat on the interview committee that
determined Brown's promotion. Id. The Internal Affairs investigator encountered
several employees who believed that persons who had sexual affairs with
Kuykendall received special employment benefits. Id. One of the warden's lovers
even admitted that "there were widespread rumors that sexual affairs between
subordinates and their superior officers were 'common practice in the Department of
Corrections' and that there were rumors that employees ...secured promotion in
this way." Id.
24 Id. at 83. At one point, according to an internal affairs report, apparently
angered that plaintiff had spoken to internal affairs about the situation, Brown
imprisoned and assaulted Miller in her office and Yamamoto refused to do anything
about it. Id.
25 Id. at 83-84. At this point the warden also indicated to Miller that his
relationship with Brown was "finished" and that he should have chosen her. Id. at
84.
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Plaintiff Mackey's allegations of harassment, while not as
severe as Miller's, were numerous. Mackey suffered verbal abuse
in front of other employees, a decrease in pay, and interference
with her duties at the hands of Brown, who was angered that
Mackey was considering complaining about Brown's relationship
with Kuykendall. 26 In addition to the specific actions and
statements aimed at Miller and Mackey, there was also evidence
of activities that affected the workplace in general: employees
witnessed the warden and one of his lovers fondling each other
and at various times the three women were seen fighting over
27
the warden in emotional scenes at work.
Plaintiffs eventually complained to internal affairs about the
situation. 28 Their complaint and statements to internal affairs
(which were apparently leaked) angered everyone involved in the
sexual relationships and, as a consequence, plaintiffs were
subjected to additional ostracism and harassment. 29 In one
instance, Brown followed Miller home after an angry
confrontation at work, resulting in a court order that required
Brown to stay away from Miller. 30 Suffering from increasing
stress 31 and humiliation at work, Miller and Mackey resigned
from the Department in August of 1998 and the winter of 1999,
respectively.
Plaintiffs filed complaints with the California Fair
Employment and Housing Authority in March of 1999 alleging,
among other things, that the warden's sexual favoritism
constituted discrimination and harassment. 32 Defendants moved
for summary judgment. The trial judge determined the evidence
of the warden's sexual favoritism did not constitute
26 Id. at 85. Mackey also feared adverse job action if she complained about the
relationship because she had witnessed the termination of another woman who had
complained about the "improper affair." Id. She also witnessed Brown physically
assault Miller after she complained about the affair. Id.
27

Id. at 83.

Id. Internal Affairs conducted an investigation and determined that "[b]oth
relationships [the warden-Brown relationship and the Brown-Yamamoto relationship] were viewed by staff as unethical from a business practice standpoint and one
[sic] that created a hostile working environment." Id. at 82.
29 Id. at 84-85. Apparently, even inmates at the prison thought that Miller was
attempting to have the warden fired. Miller and Mackey both suffered adverse job
actions (reduction in responsibilities, denial of work experience needed to be
promoted and suspension of disability accommodations). Id.
28

30

Id. at 84.

31 Id. Mackey also had health problems as a result of the stress. Id. at 85.
32 Id. at 85.
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summary
and
awarded
or
harassment
discrimination
33
affirmed,
Court
of
Appeals
defendants.
"The
adjudication to the
concluding that a supervisor who grants favorable employment
opportunities to a person with whom the supervisor is having a
sexual affair does not, without more, commit sexual harassment
toward other, nonfavored employees." 34 The Court of Appeals
found that the plaintiffs had not stated an actionable hostile
claim because, although they had
work environment
"demonstrated unfair conduct in the workplace," the preferential
treatment of the lovers did not rise to a "concerted pattern of
harassment sufficiently pervasive to have altered the conditions
35
of their employment on the basis of sex."
The unanimous Supreme Court of California reversed the
rulings of the lower courts and held that "an employee may
establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment. . . by
demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or
pervasive enough to alter his or her working conditions and
create a hostile work environment." 36 In so holding, the court
relied almost exclusively on Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") policy guidance regarding employer
Following the standard
liability for sexual favoritism. 37
recommended by the EEOC, the court stated that "an employee
may establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment ...by
demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or
pervasive enough to alter his or her working conditions and
create a hostile work environment." 38 The court then applied this
standard to the facts of Miller and concluded that the "evidence
proffered by [the] plaintiffs, viewed in its entirety, established a
prima facie case of sexual harassment under a hostile-work39
environment theory."
The court found that the plaintiffs were able to show "far
more than that a supervisor engaged in an isolated workplace
sexual affair and accorded special benefits to a sexual partner";
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.

at 85-86.
at 86.

36 Id. at 90. As discussed infra note 52, Miller was decided under California
state law but this Comment expands the court's analysis and explores Miller's
impact on Title VII sexual harassment claims.
37 Id. at 88-90.

38 Id. at 90.
39 Id.
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the plaintiffs demonstrated the impact of widespread favoritism
on the work environment and that this had created an
atmosphere that was "demeaning to women." 40
The court
rejected the defendant's contention that recognition of a sexual
favoritism cause of action would result in regulation of personal
relationships because the court found that it "is not the
41
relationship, but its effect on the workplace, that is relevant."
The court reasoned that the negative effect on the non-favored
employees and work environment that resulted from the
warden's affairs diminished concerns the court may have had
42
about intruding on the privacy of the relationships.
The Miller decision received a great deal of media attention,
including a New York Times article, 43 a lengthy analysis piece on
CNN.com, 44 and a mention in The Economist, which heralded the
45
decision as providing "a new definition of sexual harassment."
The decision was deemed a "victory" for women 46 and for "the
unloved" workers who "can no longer be treated as second class
citizens because they are not putting out."47 Both defense and
plaintiff law firms rushed to classify the case as
"groundbreaking," 48 "sound[ing] [an] alarm" to employers, 49 and
as "a ruling that significantly expanded the law on sexual
harassment in the workplace." 50 The general consensus seemed
40 Id.
at 93. The court detailed the facts in Miller that it believed amounted to
widespread favoritism: admissions by the participants concerning the nature of the
relationships, boasting by the favored women, eyewitness accounts of incidents of
public fondling, repeated promotion despite lack of qualifications, Kuykendall's
admission that he could not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with
her, and the Department's internal affairs report which confirmed the favoritism. Id.
41 Id.
at 94.
42 Id.
43 Navarro, supra note 1.
44 Grossman, supra note 2.
45 Employment Law: When Sex Is Unfair, THE ECONOMIST, July 23, 2005, at 46.
46 Kim
Curtis, High Court Agrees Women Harassed, MONTEREY COUNTY
HERALD (July 19, 2005); Hudson, supra note 17.
47 Navarro, supra note 1.
48 Curtis, supra note 46 (citing Phil Horowitz of the California Employment
Lawyers Association who classifies the decision as "groundbreaking").
49 California Ruling on Workplace Romance Sends Employers Scrambling for
Cover, JACKSON LEWIS LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 8, 2005, availableat http://www.jackson
lewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=827.
50 Navarro, supra note 1; see also Workplace Romance May Create Hostile Work
Environment for Other Employees, JACKSON LEWIS LEGAL UPDATE, July 22, 2005,
available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/articleprint.cfmaid=818
(characterizing the decision as a "significant expansion of sexual harassment law"
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to be that Miller had huge implications for employees and
employers, including ending sexual relationships between
coworkers and forcing employers to closely police employee
relationships in order to avoid Miller-like liability. 51
The media and legal community recognized that Miller was
"groundbreaking" in its proclamation that a consensual sexual
relationship between a boss and a subordinate could create a
sexual harassment claim for another group of employees. This
Comment argues that from the viewpoint of a Title VII sexual
harassment claimant, 52 the narrow analysis the Miller court used
in arriving at its holding was not at all "groundbreaking," and, in
fact, creates numerous barriers for victims 53 of sexual favoritism.
Further the Miller court's focus on the narrow guidelines issued
by the EEOC as the way in which a sexual favoritism claim
should be analyzed significantly disadvantages Title VII
claimants.
This Comment explains that while the Miller court came to
the correct conclusion that sexual favoritism can be grounds for
an actionable hostile environment sexual harassment claim, the
court's analysis of the issue and use of narrow EEOC guidelines
in arriving at that conclusion was not only unnecessary in light
of current sexual harassment jurisprudence, but will likely be
fatal to Title VII plaintiffs if later courts follow Miller and
similarly analyze sexual favoritism claims. Thus, while Miller is
and "groundbreaking"); Jack Sholkoff, CaliforniaSupreme Court Expands Definition
of Sexual Harassment;Court Imposes New Duties on Employers To Monitor Effects of
Consensual Relationships Between Employees, HOLLAND & KNIGHT NEWSLETTERS &
ALERTS, July 19, 2005, available at http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/Newsletters

.asp?IssueID=591 (stating that Miller "dramatically increase[s] the potential
breadth of sexual harassment law").
51 See Navarro, supra note 1.
52 Miller was decided under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA). This Comment, however, will analyze the Miller court's approach as applied
to a Title VII sexual harassment claim. As the Miller court itself noted, both the
FEHA and Title VII use "comparable" language and "share the common goal of
preventing discrimination in the workplace." Miller, 115 P.3d at 88. As discussed
infra Part II, application of sexual favoritism claims in the Title VII arena presents
a clear and ongoing challenge for claimants and thus is the issue explored in this
Comment. Analysis of Miller in light of the FEHA or other state law protections is
not covered within the scope of this Comment, but is both an important and
interesting area for further exploration.
53 Please note that throughout this paper when referring to "victims" female
pronouns will be used. This is to reflect the most commonly reported situation of the
harassed subordinate being female to the male. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 549 &
n.7; Poole, supra note 9, at n.5.
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viewed by many as providing a new basis of relief for plaintiffs,
This
the road for such plaintiffs includes many obstacles.
Comment explores these obstacles erected by the Miller court's
analysis and provides a recommendation for overcoming such
barriers to sexual favoritism claims in the Title VII arena.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of sexual
harassment claims under Title VII and discusses the history of
the Supreme Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence. Part II
examines the debate over whether sexual favoritism in the
workplace is a form of sexual harassment and discusses how
courts and the EEOC have historically treated such claims.
Part III will critique the analysis of the Miller court in arriving
at its holding. This part argues that the Miller court's reliance
on the EEOC's narrow "widespread" favoritism standard creates
numerous problems for plaintiffs who wish to bring sexual
favoritism claims under Title VII. This "widespread" favoritism
standard has the effect of translating Miller into an aberration
rather than groundbreaking case law because Miller's egregious
facts allow defense attorneys and courts to easily limit Miller to
its facts.
Part IV explains that the Miller court erred in applying the
EEOC's "widespread" favoritism standard rather than deciding
the case under the Supreme Court's definition of an actionable
hostile environment sexual harassment claim. The Supreme
Court's current sexual harassment jurisprudence is seemingly
open to a claim of sexual favoritism without the additional use of
the confining EEOC guidelines on sexual favoritism.
Part V recommends that subsequent courts disregard the
EEOC's "widespread" favoritism standard and assess sexual
favoritism claims under the Supreme Court's current Title VII
sexual harassment precedent. This part also examines sexual
favoritism claims under the Supreme Court's hostile work
environment standard, and concludes with arguments against
potential criticisms of this recommendation.
I.

DEFINING SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII

The short history of sexual harassment in American
jurisprudence is one challenge to plaintiffs who wish to bring a
previously unrecognized or largely rejected claim.
Sexual
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harassment is an ill-defined "legal term of art."54 Much of the
law is ambiguously defined and standards are constantly being
shifted and reworked. 55 Future plaintiffs who bring a sexual
favoritism claim will likely struggle to assess where (if at all)
their claim will fit within the legal system's ever changing ideas
about sexual harassment.
Sexual Harassment, Title VII, and the EEOC
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an
employer ... to
an
for
practice
employment
unlawful
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's. . . sex." 56 There has been much
constitutes
what
over
disagreement
and
discussion
discrimination because of sex,5 7 and, unfortunately, there is little
legislative history to assist in interpreting Title VII's prohibition
against sex discrimination. 58 Courts and commentators began
grappling whether sex-based harassment constituted sex
discrimination in the 1970s. 59 Initially, some lower courts
rejected the idea that sexual harassment was a form of sex
discrimination, finding that the harassment was "morally
objectionable" but not discrimination. 60 By the 1980s, however,
obstacles to claims of sexual discrimination based on sexual
61
harassment had eroded.

A.

54

Van Tol, supra note 3, at 156.

55 See Phillips, supra note 12, at 547. Confusion abounds over the definition of

sexual harassment in popular culture as well. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized
Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2083 (noting that "[tihe press has uncritically
characterized everything from consensual sex to forcible rape under the common
label of 'sexual harassment' ").
56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
57 Mary C. Manemann, The Meaning of 'Sex' in Title VII Is Favoring an
Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 612, 639 (1989).
58 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (lamenting that "we
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition
against discrimination based on 'sex' "). The prohibition against sex discrimination
was added hastily and many commentators have discussed the theory that "sex" was
actually added by legislators who wished to defeat the entire Act. See Manemann,
supra note 57, at 638-39.
59 See generally GWENDOLYN MINK, HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE POLITICAL
BETRAYAL OF SEXUALLY HARASSED WOMEN (2000) (discussing sex-based harassment
and sex discrimination).
60 Phillips, supra note 12, at 551.
61 See id. at 556.
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Following the trend of the courts, the EEOC in 1980 also
formally recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex-based
discrimination and issued policy guidelines explaining the
elements of sexual harassment under Title VII. 62 The EEOC's
guidelines state that "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
63
nature" violates Title VII under certain employment scenarios.
Employers can be deemed liable for sexual harassment based on
either a quid pro quo or hostile work environment theory. 64 In
quid pro quo sexual harassment (literally "something for
something"), 65 tangible job benefits from the employer are
conditioned upon the employee performing sexual acts. 66 Quid
pro quo harassment is of the explicit or implicit "sleep with me or
you're fired" variety. 67 Hostile environment sexual harassment
typically occurs when inappropriate behavior causes the
workplace to become sexually charged. For example, "unwelcome
sex-related inquiries, jokes, slurs, propositions, touchings, and
other kinds of abuse directed at an employee by either a
supervisor or a fellow worker" constitute hostile environment
sexual harassment. 68 The EEOC guidelines helped provide a
framework for the lower courts and were quite influential. Lower
courts received some much needed guidance from the Supreme
Court in 1986, which further helped to define the unclear concept
of sexual harassment.
B.

Sexual Harassmentand the Supreme Court

In the 1986 landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 69 the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as an
unlawful form of discrimination under Title VII.7 0 While the
62 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004) (defining sexual harassment under Title VII).
The Supreme Court has indicated that while the EEOC Guidelines are not binding
on the courts, they can be looked to for guidance. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
63 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
64 Id. The employer can be liable for sexual harassment on either the quid pro
quo or hostile work environment theory.
65 See Manemann, supra note 57, at 649.
66 See id.
67 G. Roger King, Sexual Harassment Claims in the New Millennium: A
Litigator'sPoint of View, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 539, 540 (2001).
68 Phillips, supra note 12, at 555.
69 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70 Id. at 73.
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facts of Meritor likely could have substantiated a sexual
harassment claim based upon the quid pro theory of sexual
harassment, the Court instead used the case as an opportunity to
definitively endorse the concept that hostile work environment
sexual harassment violates Title VII. 71 The Court's rationale for
viewing hostile or abusive work environment harassment as
discrimination was grounded in the fact that such harassment
"which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of
one sex is ...[an] arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the
72
workplace."
After Meritor, hostile environment claims "became a fixture
of sexual harassment jurisprudence." 73 The Supreme Court has
only revisited sexual harassment on four other occasions, with
two of the four cases dealing primarily with employer liability for
74
supervisor and employee harassment of other employees.
75
However, in two cases, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,76 the Court provided
further guidance as to what constitutes hostile environment
sexual harassment.
In Harris, the Court considered the definition of a hostile
work environment in a case where the lower court had ruled that
the victim could not maintain an actionable claim without proof
that the harassing conduct "seriously affect[ed] plaintiffs
psychological well-being." 77 The unanimous Supreme Court
rejected this argument, stating that, "Title VII comes into play
before the harassing conduct leads [the victim] to a nervous
breakdown."7 8 The Court held that psychological injury to the
victim was not a requirement of a hostile work environment
claim, and that Title VII barred conduct that was severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively and subjectively hostile
work environment, 79 which is "determined only by looking at all

71 Id. at 64-66.
72 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
73 MINK, supra note 59, at 40.
74 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 746-47 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
75 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
76 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
77 Harris,510 U.S. at 22.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 22-23.
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the circumstances."8 0 Thus, Harris is cited for the proposition
that a hostile environment sexual harassment claim has both an
objective and subjective component: The victim must prove that
a reasonable person would believe that the harassing conduct
made the work environment hostile and that the victim herself
subjectively believed it to be hostile.8 1 In Oncale,8 2 the most
recent case which developed and defined the concept of sexual
harassment, the Court unanimously held that same-sex
harassment is an actionable form of sex discrimination.8 3 The
Court took an expansive view in Oncale stating that Title VII's
protections "must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that
84
meets the statutory requirements."
II.

HISTORY OF SEXUAL FAVORITISM

Courts and commentators have consistently disagreed over
whether victims of workplace sexual favoritism that arises from a
supervisor's consensual sexual relationship with another
85
sexual harassment claims.
employee have cognizable
Commentators also disagree over what the Title VII basis would
be for such claims if they were recognized.8 6 It appears that the
hostile environment jurisprudence is the best fit,8 7 since the
favoritism alleged may disadvantage both individuals or groups
of non-favored employees, as well as negatively impact the entire
work environment.
History of Sexual Favoritism in the Federal Courts
Prior to Miller, the overwhelming majority of rulings
throughout the federal circuits had consistently held that
consensual sexual relationships in the workplace do not
constitute discrimination based upon sex or sexual harassment,
but rather reflect the "personal preference" of a supervisor to
engage in relations with one employee over another.8 8 The courts
A.

80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 23.
See King, supra note 67, at 540.
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
Id. at 82.

Id. at 80.
See discussion infra Part II.A.

See generally Manemann, supra note 57, at 645-51 (examining the different
ways that a sexual favoritism claim may "fit" under Title VII).
87 Id. at 651; see also Van Tol, supra note 3, at 177-78.
88 See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d
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acknowledged that it is "unfair"8 9 for a supervisor to provide job
benefits to a subordinate with whom he is in a sexual
relationship while denying benefits to other employees; yet, the
courts refused to recognize such a situation as rising to a level
where it creates a cause of action on behalf of the non-sexually
favored employees. 90 Courts have used various means to exclude
sexual favoritism from the protection of Title VII. In the leading
case of DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center,9' the
Second Circuit relied on a narrow definition of the word "sex" in
Title VII to hold that consensual sexual relationships do not
constitute sex discrimination. The DeCintio court's rationale was
that because an employee of the opposite sex could have suffered
the same negative impacts from the supervisor's sexual
favoritism, the non-favored employee was not disadvantaged
92
based upon gender.
Cir. 1986).
89 Id.
90 Id.; see also Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003)

(reasoning that "when an employer discriminates in favor of a paramour, such an

action is not sex-based discrimination, as the favoritism, while unfair, disadvantages
both sexes alike for reasons other than gender"); Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp.,
304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that "Title VII does not, however, prevent
employers from favoring employees because of personal relationships. Whether the
employer grants employment perks to an employee because she is a proteg6, an old
friend, a close relative or a love interest, that special treatment is permissible");
Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (follwing DeCintio
and affirming dismissal of claim on issue of "whether preferential treatment based
on a consensual relationship between a supervisor and an employee constitutes a
cognizable sex discrimination cause of action under Title VII"); Taken v. Okla. Corp.
Comm'n., 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that "[flavoritism, unfair
treatment and unwise business decisions do not violate Title VII unless based on a
prohibited classification"); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "even accepting as true the fact that the commanding officer was
accepting sexual favors . . . this conduct does not amount to sexual discrimination
against [plaintiff] under Title VII"); Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975
F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that "A co-worker's romantic involvement
with a supervisor does not by itself create a hostile work environment."); Alberto v.
Bank of Am., No. C-94-1283-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13520, at *8-14 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 15, 1995) (describing the uneven split among the circuits that do not find
sexual favoritism actionable and the one circuit which seems to support the cause of
action).
91 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
92 See id. at 308. The logic apparently is if a male supervisor prefers female X, a
male employee is disadvantaged in the same way as other female employees-the
supervisor only prefers female X, not any of the other employees whether male or
female. Thus sexual favoritism in the workplace, while "unfair," is not
discrimination based on sex: both non-favored female and non-favored male
employees are equally disadvantaged.
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While the large majority of federal courts follow the logic of
DeCintio in holding that sexual favoritism is not actionable
under Title VII, 93 several district court decisions have held that
sexual favoritism may violate Title VII. 9 4 These few opinions
that favor recognition of a sexual favoritism claim do so because
they deem the "theoretical underpinnings" 95 of such a claim to be
no different than a Title VII sexual harassment claim. However,
other courts, including DeCintio,96 have either flat-out rejected
(or distinguished) these pro-sexual favoritism claim cases.
It is important to note that although DeCintio was decided in
the same year as Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,97 in which the
Supreme Court recognized hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims, 98 the DeCintio court did not examine the
possibility of a sexual favoritism claim in light of Meritor.99
Several courts that have considered sexual favoritism claims
within the context of a hostile work environment have indicated
that sexual favoritism
may contribute
to a
hostile
environment.100 The large majority of courts, however, continue
to follow DeCintio's holding and narrow definition of what
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII and do not
consider the possibility that sexual favoritism could rise to the
level of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 1 1 One
commentator has stated that this "erroneously narrow view"
regarding the doctrine of sexual favoritism, embodied by the
EEOC, and utilized by the courts following DeCintio, reflects a
1 0 2 however, neither
misinterpretation of Meritor;
the EEOC nor
the majority of federal courts seem willing to revisit their
rejection of sexual favoritism.

93

See Phillips, supra note 12, at 559-60 n.68.

94 See id. at 561 n.74.
95 Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).
96

See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 307.

97 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
98 Id. at 66.

99 See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-07 (acknowledging Meritor, but not considering
the hostile environment framework in analysis).
100 See, e.g., Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 859-62 (3d Cir.
1990); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1277-78 (D.D.C. 1988).
101 See Phillips, supra note 12, at 559.
102 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 177.
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B. EEOC Guidelineson Sexual Favoritism
In 1990, the EEOC issued its Policy Guidance on Employer
Liability Under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism [the "EEOC
Guidelines"]. 1 3
The purpose of the policy was to "provide
guidance on the extent to which an employer should be held
liable for discriminating against individuals who are qualified for
but are denied an employment opportunity or benefit, where the
individual who is granted the opportunity or benefit received it
04
because that person submitted to sexual advances or requests."'
The guidelines state explicitly that the EEOC believes that "[n]ot
10 5
all types of sexual favoritism violate Title VII."'
The EEOC Guidelines define three instances of favoritism,
only two of which are deemed to violate Title VII. The first
instance involves "isolated instance[s] of favoritism toward[s] a
'paramour.' "106 Under this category of favoritism, the "charging
party" loses a promotion that he or she was qualified for because
the employee that obtained the promotion was involved in a
consensual sexual relationship with their supervisor.10 7 The
EEOC would deem this situation "an isolated instance of
favoritism," which, though "unfair," is not a violation of Title
VII. 08 Thus, this "isolated" category of favoritism mirrors the
Second Circuit's holding in DeCintio.
The second category of favoritism is "[b]ased [u]pon [cloerced
[slexual [c]onduct," which the EEOC states "[m]ay [c]onstitute
[q]uid [p]ro [quo [h]arassment" in violation of Title VII.109 This
circumstance arises when the relationship between the favored
coworker and the supervisor was not consensual; for example,
where the non-favored employee's supervisor "regularly harassed
the [favored] co-worker in front of other employees, demanded
sexual favors as a condition for her promotion, and then audibly
boasted about his 'conquest.' "110 Given these facts, the non103 EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915-048, POLICY
GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (Jan.
12, 1990), availableat http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html.
104 Id.

105 Id.
107

Id.
See id. (providing an example of "isolated" favoritism).

108

Id.

106

109 Id.

110See id. (providing an example of favoritism based upon coerced sexual
conduct).
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favored employee may be able to establish a violation of Title VII
by showing that the promotion was conditioned upon granting
sexual favors to the supervisor. The gravamen of this category is
that the underlying supervisor-subordinate relationship was
coerced rather than consensual, the former which the EEOC
deems "substantially the same as a traditional sexual
harassment [claim]."'
Under the EEOC's third category, "[w]idespread [f]avoritism
[m]ay [c]onstitute [h]ostile [e]nvironment [h]arassment" in
violation of Title VII.112 The EEOC explains that supervisors
who are engaged in "widespread sexual favoritism" send the
message that the way for women to get ahead in the workplace is
to have sex with supervisors, which in turn sends the message
that supervisors view women as "sexual playthings." 11 3 The
example that the EEOC provides of widespread favoritism is
where a non-favored employee loses a promotion she was
qualified for because the employee who obtained the promotion
114
was engaged in a sexual relationship with their supervisor.
However, this differs from the first "isolated favoritism" category
that is not actionable under Title VII, because in this instance,
supervisors and other management personnel "regularly solicited
sexual favors from subordinate employees and offered job
opportunities to those who complied." 1 5 Aside from these
examples, the EEOC provides no other guidance as to what level
of favoritism would be deemed "widespread" (and thus
actionable) versus "isolated" (and thus not actionable).
C.

The Underlying Debate About Whether Sexual Favoritism
Should Be Recognized
The federal court cases, discussed above in Part II.A, reflect
the main problem that arises for the courts, plaintiffs, and
employers when facing a sexual favoritism claim: not all sexrelated activity in the workplace is illegal."1 6 The majority of the
Circuits seem more comfortable with employing a narrow reading
111 See id.
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
See id.

115 Id.

See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile
Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 733 (2002) (noting that "welcome conduct does
not cause sexual harassment harm").
116
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of Title VII rather than expanding the statute's protections to
sexual favoritism claims that derive from a consensual sexual
relationship.1 17 Miller, with its emphasis on wholly consensual
sexual activity that the court held resulted in sexual harassment
of employees uninvolved in the sexual relationship, illustrates
the complex and murky line between what is deemed acceptable
workplace behavior, as opposed to behavior that creates a hostile
work environment for which an employer can be held civilly
liable. 118 It is perhaps because of this unclear boundary that
courts and legal scholars have consistently disagreed about
whether sexual favoritism in the workplace that results from a
consensual relationship can give rise to an actionable sexual
harassment claim on behalf of the non-favored employee.' 19 The
EEOC attempted to assist courts and parties by issuing its Policy
Guidelines on Sexual Favoritism; however, these guidelines
employ the same narrow analysis of the DeCintio court 120 and
place many limits on potential recognition of sexual favoritism
claims.
Between the federal courts' rejection of sexual favoritism
claims and the EEOC's attitude, which severely narrows the
probable basis for such a claim 121 to only those situations where
the favoritism is "widespread" or based on a "coerced"
relationship, it seemed as if sexual favoritism had little potential
for recognition as a prohibited form of sexual harassment. The
Miller court dove head first into this complex area of law when it
declared that sexual favoritism in the workplace may establish a
claim of sexual harassment under a hostile work environment
117 See DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir.
1986) (expressing concerns about the implications of a reading of Title VII that
encompasses actionable sexual favoritism).
118 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986) (defining
actionable sexual harassment under Title VII).
119 See, e.g., Knadler v. Furth, No. C 04-01220 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21278, at *16-18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005) (describing discord among the courts).
Compare Levy, supra note 12, at 668-69 (agreeing with the trend of not allowing
sexual favoritism claims to be covered by Title VII), and Phillips, supra note 12, at
549-50 (arguing that sexual favoritism that is not factually linked to sexual
harassment, does not fall under the protections of Title VII), with Manemann, supra
note 57, at 615 (concluding that sexual favoritism violates Title VII), and Van Tol,
supra note 3, at 156 ("[P]referential treatment in the workplace based on sexual
favoritism should be actionable under Title VII as a form of employment
discrimination.").
120 See Levy, supra note 12, at 682.
121 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 155.
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theory, 122 thus giving victims of workplace sexual favoritism hope
for redress and renewing questions about the viability of sexual
favoritism as an actionable Title VII claim.
III. MILLER'S RELIANCE ON THE 'WIDESPREAD"
FAVORITISM STANDARD

Given the strong historical rejection by the federal courts of
recognizing sexual favoritism as an actionable claim, the Miller
court deserves kudos for its courage to reverse the rulings of the
two lower courts and reject decades of precedent that by in large
deemed sexual favoritism as nothing more than "unfair." The
Miller court, however, created a sizable challenge for victims of a
hostile work environment created by sexual favoritism, especially
in the Title VII context, due to its analysis and use of the
"widespread" favoritism standard.
A.

The Miller Court's Use of the EEOC's Widespread Favoritism
Standard
The Miller court began its opinion by stating that it agreed
with the Supreme Court that "to prevail, an employee claiming
harassment based upon a hostile work environment must
demonstrate that the conduct complained of was severe enough
or sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create a work environment that qualifies as hostile or
abusive to employees because of their sex." 123 However, after
stating the Supreme Court's accepted hostile work environment
standard, the court then moves to a verbatim recitation of the
EEOC Guidelines. The Miller court does not explain why these
guidelines are necessary in evaluating Miller's or Mackey's claim
of sexual harassment 124 or how the EEOC Guidelines fit within
the Supreme Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence. After
discussing
the
EEOC
Guidelines
and
the
EEOC's
recommendation of the "widespread" favoritism concept, the
Miller court announced the standard it felt should be employed
122 See Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115
123 Id. at 87 (citing Aguilar v. Avis

P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005).
Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal.
1999), relying upon Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
124 A read of the Miller opinion truly is perplexing in this sense. The Miller
court cites the Supreme Court but then immediately moves on to discuss the EEOC
Guidelines without making any connection between why, given the Supreme Court's
sexual harassment jurisprudence, the EEOC Guidelines should even be considered.

1380

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:1361

in a sexual favoritism based hostile work environment claim:
Following the guidance of the EEOC, and also employing
standards adopted in our prior cases, we believe that an
employee may establish an actionable claim of sexual
harassment... by demonstrating that widespread sexual
favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter his or her
working conditions and create a hostile work environment. 125
In addition to embracing the "widespread" favoritism
standard, the Miller court describes the difference between an
actionable sexual favoritism based hostile work environment
claim and a non-actionable claim in the following manner:
[A]lthough an isolated instance of favoritism on the part of a
supervisor toward a female employee with whom the
supervisor ...conduct[ed] a consensual sexual affair ordinarily
would not constitute sexual harassment, when such sexual
favoritism in a workplace is sufficiently widespread it may
create an actionable hostile work environment.126
The Miller court's analysis clearly distinguished the two
"poles" of the EEOC's sexual favoritism framework: "isolated"
and "widespread."'127 While it is clear from the Miller court's
perspective that liability for all office romances turns on the fine
distinction between "isolated" sexual favoritism, which is not
actionable, and "widespread" sexual favoritism, which creates a
hostile work environment, 128 the court's opinion does not explain
why it finds these two distinctions relevant to a discussion of an
actionable hostile work environment.
The Miller court's use of this "widespread" favoritism
standard is perplexing.
It adopts the EEOC-recommended
requirement of "widespread" favoritism, but does not explain why
the Miller court felt that sexual favoritism based hostile work
environment claims required a standard different from the
Supreme Court's requirements for sustaining an actionable
hostile work environment claim (which the Miller court had cited
with approval at the outset of its opinion). Further, the Miller
court does not discuss why the obscure fifteen-year-old EEOC

126

Miller, 115 P.3d at 90 (emphasis added).
Id. at 80 (emphasis added).

127

See supra Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the EEOC's Sexual

125

Favoritism Guidelines and the standard promulgated thereunder.
128 See Tedesco & Harding, supra note 17 (noting that the "widespread" events
in Miller make it a unique case).
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Guidelines spurred the court to insert "widespread sexual
favoritism" as an additional element into the Supreme Court's
accepted hostile work environment framework.
This would
seemingly be a necessary explanation since the 1990 EEOC
Guidelines, which are based on a 1986 Second Circuit case,
reflect none of the Supreme Court's latest thinking on sexual
129
harassment.
B.

The Miller Court's Problematic"Widespread Favoritism"
Standard
While Miller's outcome may have been "groundbreaking," the
analysis the court employed to reach its holding leaves much to
be desired from the plaintiffs perspective. The Miller court's
advocacy of analyzing sexual favoritism claims under the narrow
"widespread" favoritism standard makes plaintiff success
unlikely. The "widespread" favoritism standard allows a claim's
outcome to turn upon an independent, ambiguous determination
of whether the conduct was "widespread." An additional obstacle
is that Miller's egregious circumstances allow defense attorneys
and courts working under the "widespread" favoritism standard
to easily limit the case to its facts, which will likely have the
effect of casting the case as an aberration.
1.

"Widespread" Is Too Narrow To Provide Meaningful
Guidance

Commentators state that the narrowness of the EEOC
Guidelines "all but killed any life the sexual favoritism cause of
action had," 130 and "signals ... [the EEOC's] intention to narrow
the scope of an employer's liability for sexual favoritism." 131 One
commentator even asserts that "voluntary trading in sexual
currency is for the most part accepted by the... [EEOC]."132 The
reason for this negative view is that under the EEOC's
"widespread" favoritism standard, adopted by the Miller court,
sexual favoritism would be found actionable in so few cases that
129 Heavy reliance on the fifteen-year-old EEOC guidelines, which do not
encompass state of the art thinking on sexual harassment, certainly seems to
present nothing new in terms of a standard by which a sexual favoritism claim
becomes actionable.
130 Poole, supra note 9, at 841.
131 Van Tol, supra note 3, at 155.
132 Poole, supra note 9, at 822.
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the majority of sexual favoritism victims would not be able to
133
maintain a claim.
As discussed previously, 134 the EEOC Guidelines counsel
that sexual favoritism should only be found if such favoritism is
on a coerced (non-consensual) relationship or is
either based 135
"widespread."
Under the Guidelines, "Title VII does not
prohibit isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon
consensual romantic relationships.... [It] may be unfair, but it
does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title
VII."136
The EEOC's policy effectively adopted the Second
Circuit's 1986 DeCintio holding that deemed preferential sexual
favoritism resulting from consensual relationships "unfair"13 7 but
138
not a violation of Title VII.
Scholarly thinking indicates that the EEOC recognized that
DeCintio's very narrow holding, essentially eliminating sexual
favoritism as an actionable Title VII claim, did not coalesce with
the Supreme Court's more expansive and accepting policy
regarding hostile work environment claims expressed in
Meritor.13 9 Presumably, the EEOC was not free to ignore the
Supreme Court entirely. Recognizing this, the EEOC employed
DeCintio's narrow view as the gravamen of the Guidelines;
however, as a nod to Meritor, the EEOC added grounds for
maintaining a sexual favoritism claim under the stringent
standards of either "a coerced sexual relationship" or
"widespread" favoritism
that creates a
hostile work
environment. 140
In practice this means that courts must
133 See id. at 821-22.
134 See discussion supra Part II.B.
135 It is very interesting to note that the EEOC Chairman at the time the Sexual

Favoritism Guidelines were released was Clarence Thomas, who is not a proponent
of an expansive view of workplace sexual harassment. See MINK, supra note 59, at
32.
136 EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supranote 102 (emphasis added).
137 DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986).
138 Id.
139 Levy, supra note 12, at 686; see also Van Tol, supra note 3, at 155 (discussing
EEOC adoption of DeCintio).
140 In discussing the EEOC's obligation to pay lip service to the Supreme Court's
recognition of hostile environment sexual harassment claims, Poole explained:
The EEOC ... apparently recognized that this [DeCintio-based]policy was
not fully compatible with the Supreme Court's holding in Meritor, where
sexual activity or conduct can be highly corrAated to gender and result in
unlawful discrimination. The EEOC, therefore, recognized two limited
forms of "sexual favoritism" claims. One form of actionable sexual
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determine whether the facts of a consensual sexual favoritism
case fit into the narrow category of "widespread" favoritism, and,
if not, the case must be dismissed. There is no middle ground for
actionable claims.
Given the choice between "widespread" or "isolated"
favoritism, it is likely that the result in most situations will be
that the court will deem the favoritism "isolated" since the bar to
prove "widespread" favoritism is extremely high 4 1 and courts
historically have not favored sexual favoritism claims. 142 Since a
plaintiff in a sexual favoritism case cannot prevail upon a
showing of favoritism that is anything less than "widespread,"
one commentator has noted that "the prospects for attacking
sexual favoritism as work environment sexual harassment look
dim."' 4 3
The "widespread" favoritism standard fails to "recognize that
in some instances even an isolated case of sexual favoritism can
be sufficiently abusive to affect a 'term, condition or privilege' of
employment within the meaning of Title VII."'144 The EEOC's
guidance that sexual favoritism can only exist in two narrow
situations, with no remedy in between, does not provide realistic
or meaningful guidance and fails to recognize that sexual
favoritism that is not sufficiently "widespread" may still result in
an objectively hostile or abusive work environment under Title
VII. 145

2.

"Widespread" Ignores Actual Harm to Plaintiffs
As one commentator notes, "'widespread' has the potential of
favoritism is based upon explicit or implicitly coerced sexual conduct. The

other form of actionable sexual favoritism arises when sexual favoritism is
widespread in the workplace.
Poole, supra note 9, at 842.
141 See EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 103.
142 Considering that the strong majority of courts reject sexual favoritism as
actionable, it is likely that those courts, when given the chance between deeming
facts "widespread" or "isolated," would gravitate towards "isolated" so that the

sexual favoritism would not be actionable.
Phillips, supra note 12, at 594.
Van Tol, supra note 3, at 180 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986)).
145 The Miller court's standard does not consider that most victims of sexual
favoritism will fall between "widespread" and "isolated" since there is a continuum of
conduct that constitutes sexual harassment. See Diane Gentry, Essay, Title VII
Limitations-Keeping the Workplace Hostile, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 393, 393,
404-05 (2002) (discussing the concept that harassment occurs on a continuum).
143

144
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being vague" and the difference between an "isolated" sexual
favoritism claim, which is not actionable, and a "widespread"
146
sexual favoritism claim, which is actionable, is de minimis.
The "widespread" favoritism requirement focuses on the
apparent number of instances of favoritism rather than on the
harm that the favoritism caused the victim, 147 and provides little
guidance to plaintiffs or courts as to what level of sexuallycharged conduct equals "widespread" favoritism.
The following example, proffered by one commentator,
illustrates the vague and ambiguous nature of the "widespread"
favoritism standard and its propensity to ignore actual harm to
sexual favoritism victims when applied. The difficulty with the
"widespread" favoritism standard can be demonstrated by asking
about its application to a small field office with only one
supervisor and four employees. 148 Presumably, a situation with
"widespread" sexual favoritism assumes an environment where
there are many employees and many supervisors. In the small
field office situation, could an employee show a hostile
environment claim based on "widespread" sexual favoritism if the
supervisor sleeps with two different employees over a period of
several years? It seems that this is a situation where other
employees, simply because of the small size of their work
environment, could be particularly affected by detrimental job
treatment due to workplace sexual favoritism, since the
employees have little room for growth and are very dependant
upon the one supervisor for advancement. However, we do not
know whether this scenario possibly constitutes "widespread"
favoritism. In fact, it would seem that because of the extended
time period over which the conduct occurred and the low number
146 See Poole, supra note 9, at 843.
147 The EEOC guidelines provide nothing other than the assertion

that

actionable sexual favoritism must be "widespread." Thus, we do not know the exact
number of instances required or even what the ballpark number of instances of
favoritism would be to have an actionable claim. Even with this ambiguity, however,
it is apparent that there is a focus on the quantity of instances of favoritism. See
EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 103.
148 See Poole, supra note 9, at 843 ("Conceivably, a practice or pattern of
improper behavior in work environments could occur when, in a small office, only
one promotion per year is possible but the supervisor's new paramour gets it for two
consecutive years ....[T]he difference between isolated instances and widespread
cases of actionable sexual favoritism is rather small."). Of course, Title VII only
applies to employers with 15 or more employees. Nevertheless, this situation could
arise in a small field or branch office of a larger employer.
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of individuals involved, the favoritism would be deemed
"isolated" no matter how much damage resulted to the nonfavored employees.
This example illustrates the difficulty with a standard that
is essentially based on numbers of instances rather than an
assessment of the degree of damage to the victim. With such a
vague, ambiguous standard it is possible for a court to deem any
case, on its facts, more "isolated" than "widespread" no matter
what harm the victim suffered due to the supervisor's sexual
favoritism of another employee.
3.

"Widespread" Easily Allows Both Defendants and Courts To
Distinguish Miller

While sexual harassment is often "subtle,"'149 the use of a
standard that demands facts which show "widespread" favoritism
ignores this.
Reliance on the requirement of "widespread"
favoritism makes it likely that the legacy of Miller, rather than
being groundbreaking, will permit courts to decide that the facts
of subsequent cases must be as outrageous as those of this case
in order to constitute "widespread" sexual favoritism. Defense
law firms have already taken note of the "extreme" facts of
Miller.150
One devastating consequence of the "widespread"
requirement is that defendants will be able to easily argue that
the facts of their case do not add up to the level of workplace
sexual activity and favoritism seen in Miller and distinguish
their case as not meeting the "widespread" favoritism standard.
In reality, it is unlikely that many work environments will
rise to the "outrageous" level of Miller,'5' with a supervisor
providing blatant job benefits to three different sexual partners
and then one of those sexual partners becoming a bi-sexual
partner of yet another supervisor who significantly alters the

Gentry, supra note 145, at 393.
See Ron Brand, Favoring a Paramour May Be Sexual Harassment, LABOR
LETTER (Fisher & Phillips LLP, Irvine, Cal.), Oct. 2005, at 3, available at
http://laborlawyers.com/CM/Labor%20Letter/eLLoctoberr2005.pdf
(stating
that
"[t]he facts in the Miller case were a bit extreme"); Foley & Lardner, Employer
Liability for Customer Harassment of its Employees, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING,
Aug. 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12137662 ('The facts of this case are seamy
and outrageous and it is difficult to sort out the retaliatory and exploitive acts of the
women who were sleeping with Kuykendall from the conduct that might constitute
sexual harassment.").
151 See Foley & Lardner, supra note 150.
149
150
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working conditions of the plaintiff. Compared to the pronounced
facts of Miller, a court may easily, or even automatically, find a
situation to be an "isolated" instance of sexual favoritism rather
than actionable "widespread" favoritism.
The court in the
Northern District of California, which considered a sexual
favoritism claim in the wake of Miller, was able to do exactly
that. 15 2 Drawing on the numerous federal circuits that reject
sexual favoritism claims 153 and viewing Miller as only applying to
situations where the sexual favoritism was as widespread as it
was at the Department of Corrections,1 54 the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs claim out of court without much
consideration. As illustrated by this recent post-Miller case, if
courts are left with the idea that the "soap-opera" worthy facts of
Miller must exist in order for an actionable sexual favoritism
claim to arise, then Miller actually means very little in terms of a
change in the law.
IV.

MILLER'S UNNECESSARY AND IMPROPER USE OF THE
'WIDESPREAD" STANDARD UNDER
CURRENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

The most curious aspect of the Miller court's use of the
"widespread" standard is that it was entirely unnecessary.
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence appears open to sexual
favoritism claims under the Court's current hostile work
environment approach. An examination of the three Supreme
Court rulings 155 that provide definitions of hostile environment
sexual harassment show the Court's propensity to treat Title VII
claims broadly and do not indicate acceptance of an additional
limitation to a plaintiffs ability to bring a sexual harassment
claim.

152 See Knadler v. Furth, No. C 04-01220 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21278, at
*21-22 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005) (declining to apply Miller to a sexual favoritism
claim and stating that "[t]he facts here do rise to the levels seen in Miller").
153 See id. at *16-18 (detailing other circuits which have similarly declined to
find sexual favoritism as creating an actionable Title VII hostile work environment
claim).
154 See id. at *21-22; supra note 152.
155 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986).
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The Court's Policy on Sexual Harassment Claims

Even as the Supreme Court has struggled to define sexual
harassment, 156 it has asserted a consistent policy regarding
hostile environment sexual harassment claims:
Title VII
"evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women' in employment."' 1 57 In
rejecting attempts to read Title VII narrowly and exclude
behavior from being considered sexual harassment, the Court
has explained that, "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principle evil to cover reasonably comparable evils ... ."58 In its
sexual harassment jurisprudence, the Court has never endorsed
a narrow view of either the behavior that may be considered
sexual harassment 159 or the level of injury required by plaintiffs
to prove they were victims of sexual harassment. 160 This all
stems from the fact that the Court respects Title VII as a
remedial statute, and to effectuate this goal the Court interprets
Title VII broadly to provide victims of discrimination with a
161
remedy.
In Oncale,16 2 which extended the definition of sexual
harassment to include same-sex harassment, the Court simply
stated that Title VII should be read to include "sexual
63
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory" definition.
The Court used this expansive language even though it
156 Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and
Reasonable People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791, 792 (2002)
(stating that "[p]art of the ambiguity in [sexual harassment law] may well stem from
the nature of the legal standards developed by the courts").
157 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64
(quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)) (emphasis added).
158 Onacle, 523 U.S. at 79 (holding that Title VII covers same-sex sexual
harassment even though same sex harassment was not likely the conduct Congress
was targeting by enacting Title VII).
159 See Poole, supra note 9, at 855.
160 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22 (rejecting the idea that victims of hostile
environment sexual harassment must prove that they sustained psychological
injury).
161 See Poole, supra note 9, at 855 ("To fulfill Title VII's role as a remedial
statute, the Supreme Court has determined that it should be interpreted broadly,
and courts 'must avoid interpretations. . . that deprive victims of discrimination of a
remedy.' ") (quoting Mary C. Manemann, The Meaning of "Sex" in Title VII. Is
Favoring an Employee Lover a Violation of the Act?, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 612, 645
(1989)).
162 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
163 Id. at 80.
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acknowledged that same-sex harassment was not likely the
reason that Congress enacted Title VII.164 The Court does not
seem to advocate unyielding judicial restraint in sexual
harassment cases. Instead, the Court empowers lower courts to
use their power to stop harassment that creates hostile work
environments in the hopes of ameliorating the negative job
165
impacts that result for the victims.
B.

The Supreme Court's Hostile Work Environment Standard

To effectuate the remedial nature of Title VII and its goal of
workplace equality, 166 the Supreme Court has been careful to
craft a standard that allows for the broadest justice in sexual
harassment cases. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,167 the
Court gave clear guidance on how lower courts should evaluate
hostile environment claims. 68 The Court stated that the test of
whether a work environment is hostile or abusive "is not, and by
its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test" and "can be
determined only by looking at all the circumstances."'' 69 The
Court listed factors for the lower courts to weigh in making a
determination of whether a work environment is hostile: the
frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. 170 The Court instructed that "no single factor is
required."'71
By not allowing one specific factor to control in making the
determination of whether a hostile work environment exists, the
Supreme Court ensures that each allegation of harassment is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis by balancing all of the relevant
164

Id. at 79.

See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 ("A discriminatorily abusive work
environment... can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
165

discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in
their careers.").
166 See id.
167 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
168 See id. at 22-23.
169

Id.

Id. at 23.
Id. In this framework, the court was specifically chastising the lower court
which had stated that the effect of the hostile or abusive work environment on the
employee's psychological well-being was the controlling factor in determining
whether the employee could maintain a hostile work environment action. See id.
170

171
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facts and circumstances. Under this method of analysis, no
17 2
particular absolute indicates that a hostile environment exists.
This approach was further embraced in Oncale,173 where the
Court emphasized the need to view the social impact of
questioned behavior on the workplace within the "constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words
used or the physical acts performed." 174 The flexible, 175 multifaceted approach embraced by the Supreme Court in determining
whether a hostile work environment exists seems to starkly
contrast with the Miller court's rigid, single-determinant
"widespread" favoritism standard.
C. Miller's "Widespread"StandardRebuts the Supreme Court's
Teachings
The Supreme Court details the various factors that should be
considered in determining whether a hostile work environment
exists and specifically instructs that no one factor is
controlling. 176 In contrast to the Supreme Court's teachings, the
Miller court's standard in evaluating whether a hostile
environment existed at the correctional facility relies on
one controlling
factor:
whether sexual favoritism was
"widespread."1 77 By requiring "widespread" conduct prior to
allowing a hostile environment claim to proceed, the Miller
court's approach effectively rejects the flexible balancing
approach of the Supreme Court where "no single factor"
78
controls.1
Under Miller, if a plaintiff is unable to prove that favoritism
is "widespread," then the harassment will not rise to a level of
"severe" and "pervasive," and thus, will not be an actionable

172 See Beiner, supra note 156, at 793 ("Far from being inappropriate in this
setting, it seems to make sense for harassment to be judged on a case-specific basis,
considering the entire context in which the harassment occurs.").
173 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
174 Id. at 82.
175 See Manemann, supra note 57, at 617, 658 (discussing the Court's insistence
that the "required elements for a prima facie case are flexible and depend on the
facts of a particular situation").
176 See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
177 See Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005).
178 See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
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hostile work environment claim. 179 In Harris, one of the factors
the Supreme Court stated could indicate that an environment is
hostile or abusive was the frequency of the conduct.1 80 While
frequency may be analogous to "widespread" conduct, the
Supreme Court insists upon examining all of the factors and
circumstances of a given case to determine if an actionable
hostile work environment exists' 8 1-the frequency or widespread
82
nature of the conduct should only be one piece of the puzzle.
V.

THE RECOMMENDED STANDARD FOR
SEXUAL FAVORITISM CLAIMS

The Supreme Court standard for determining whether a
hostile environment exists provides many advantages over the
Miller court's more rigid and ambiguous "widespread" standard.
Sexual favoritism that meets the Supreme Court's requirements
creates no less hostile work environment than any other type of
sexual harassment and, therefore, should be measured by the
Supreme Court's standard.
A.

Look to the Leader: Use the Supreme Court's Hostile
Environment Sexual HarassmentStandardfor Sexual
Favoritism Claims

This Comment asserts that a sexual favoritism based hostile
environment sexual harassment claim should be evaluated under
the standards of the Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence.
Under the Supreme Court's definition of a hostile environment
that violates Title VII, a plaintiff is required to prove the
following elements: (1) the harassment was "sufficiently 'severe
or pervasive' as to 'alter the conditions of employment' "; (2) the
harassment was "both objectively and subjectively offensive"; and
(3) the harassment was "because of sex, and not some other,
unprotected reason."'8 3 As discussed in Part IV, these elements
are established by looking at all the circumstances and factorsone of which may include "widespread" conduct, but unlike under
179

See Miller, 115 P.3d at 90.

180 See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
181 See id.

See id.
See King, supra note 67, at 540-41 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)) (consolidating the Supreme Court hostile environment
standard from Meritor, Harris,and Oncale).
182

183
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the Miller court's analysis, this factor would not be controlling or
a "make or break" requirement.
B.

The Supreme Court StandardApplied to Sexual Favoritism
Claims

Application of the Supreme Court's standard to the facts of
Miller illustrates that the "widespread" favoritism standard is
unnecessary. Under the Supreme Court's approach, the Miller
court would have reached the same holding that sexual
favoritism may create an actionable hostile work environment.
However, the Supreme Court's standard eliminates the
undesirable aspects of the ambiguous and narrow "widespread"
favoritism approach and provides a more realistic avenue for
plaintiff redress.
Examining the allegations of the plaintiffs in Miller indicates
that they would succeed in establishing that a hostile
environment existed if the facts of their case were considered
18 4
properly under the Supreme Court's factors:
1) Frequency.
The conduct was frequent because the
plaintiffs' lives at work were impacted by sexual favoritism of the
warden and its repercussions on an almost daily basis,
sometimes multiple times per day.
This frequent conduct
extended over a period of several years.
2) Severity. The conduct was severe in that it resulted in
harassment that not only ostracized the plaintiffs and affected
their ability to perform and advance at work, but also created
stress that resulted in plaintiffs having to resign. Additionally,
the severity may be considered increased due to the fact that
plaintiffs complained about the behavior to supervisory staff and
Internal Affairs, and instead of remedying the situation it
became more severe.
3) Physical Threats or Humiliation.
The conduct was
physically threatening in that one of the warden's lovers
physically assaulted plaintiff-Miller when she spoke out about
the favoritism and on another occasion followed Miller home,
necessitating the issuance of a restraining order. Additionally,
plaintiff-Mackey was constantly humiliated in front of other
184 The Court examines: the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether the
conduct was physically threatening or humiliating (or a mere offensive utterance),
and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance. See Harris,510 U.S. at 23.
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employees and suffered health problems as a result of her work
environment.
4) Unreasonable Interference with an Employee's Work
Performance. The conduct interfered greatly with the plaintiffs'
work performance and their ability to advance in their careers.
The non-sexually favored plaintiffs were unable to go about their
day-to-day job duties due to the interferences created by the
warden and associate warden's sexual favoritism. Their jobs
were purposefully made harder by their supervisors who
punished them for complaining about the warden's sexual
favoritism by forcing them to perform onerous duties outside the
scope of their position.
Although "no single factor is required," 18 5 the egregious facts
of Miller meet all of the Supreme Court's factors. Thus, under
the balancing approach employed by the Court to determine if
the conduct at issue was severe and pervasive, these facts would
likely give rise to an actionable hostile work environment. This
application of Miller's facts to the Supreme Court approach
demonstrates that a hostile work environment based upon sexual
favoritism can be established under the Court's existing
standard. This exercise also illustrates that, under the Court's
factors, whether the favoritism is "widespread" or not has no
bearing on the harmfulness of conduct that a non-sexually
favored employee may be subjected to. Use of the Supreme
Court's standard recognizes this harm and allows the victim a
greater chance at redress because there is no controlling
"widespread" favoritism requirement.
C. Advantages of Using the Supreme Court Standardfor Sexual
Favoritism Claims
Unlike
the
Miller court's
"widespread" favoritism
requirement, the Supreme Court's totality of the circumstances
standard provides sexual favoritism victims with redress and
addresses the harm to the work environment. The Supreme
Court's approach allows the entire context in which the
harassment occurs to be considered.' 8 6 In contrast, the more
"mathematically precise test"1 87 of "widespread" favoritism

185

186
187

See id.
See Beiner, supra note 156, at 793.
See Harris,510 U.S. at 22.

2006]

MILLER V. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

1393

requires an examination of the number of consensual
relationships that create a certain number of instances of sexual
favoritism.
Under the "widespread" favoritism approach,
negative impacts on the work environment would only be
considered if the favoritism was first found to reach the
"widespread" threshold.
A variety of negative externalities stem from sexual
harassment including adverse psychological, job-related, and
health effects.18 8
This harassment equally impacts and
disadvantages employees, whether they are victims of direct
sexual harassment or sexual favoritism.1 8 9 Both groups of
victims are sent the message that the only way to advance in the
workplace is to use one's sexuality' 9 by "trading in sexual
currency" 191 for job benefits. When sexual favoritism exists in the
workplace, this perpetuates employees being measured by a
"sexual standard"' 92 rather than on their ability to perform their
job. In Miller, this "sexual standard" furthered the idea held by
employees at the correctional facility that the only way to get
ahead at work was to sleep your way to the top. 93 Considering
this, victims of workplace sexual favoritism and victims of direct
sexual harassment exist in the same hostile work environment

188 Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable
Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training By the Legal Profession, 24 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 147, 147 (2001); see also Van Tol, supra note 3,
at 165 (discussing studies on office dating in general: "[t]he negative
impact[s] ... outnumbered the positive impact[s] ....
[The negative impacts
include] gossip, complaints and gripes, hostilities, distorted communication, damage
to the image or reputation of the workplace, and redistributed work").
189 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 179. Victims of sexual favoritism can
demonstrate the same adverse impacts in their work environment as direct victims
of sexual harassment. For example, in Miller both plaintiffs indicated that they left
their jobs because of the stress of the harassment and ostracism they encountered at
work. See Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 81-85 (Cal. 2005). Additionally,
plaintiff-MacKey suffered from related stress-induced health problems. Id. There
can certainly be no question that the plaintiffs in Miller suffered from adverse job
impacts including interference with job duties, loss of pay benefits and inability to
obtain promotions they were qualified for since those promotions were instead
granted to the supervisor's sexual partner. Id.
190 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 178-79.
191See Poole, supra note 9, at 822.
192 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 179.
193 See Miller, 115 P.3d at 82 (stating that employees at the correctional facility
thought that the only way to get ahead was to "'F' [their] way to the top" after
seeing the warden consistently promote his lovers over other more qualified
applicants).
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for Title VII purposes. 194 It follows then that sexual favoritism
plaintiffs should be able to prove that their work environment
was hostile under the Supreme Court test for a hostile work
environment that balances all of the relevant factors and
harms, 19 5 rather than requiring victims of sexual favoritism to
shoulder the additional burden of proving a vague, 196
undefined,' 97 and most likely unachievable 98 "widespread"
favoritism standard.
D. Anticipated Criticismsof Using the Supreme Court's Hostile
Environment Standardfor Sexual Favoritism Claims
1.

The Sexual Favoritism Victim Is Not Directly Harassed and
Therefore Should Be Subject to Miller's Heightened
"Widespread" Favoritism Standard
Use of the Supreme Court's hostile environment standard in
sexual favoritism claims without the additional "widespread"
favoritism requirement imposed by the Miller court will likely be
criticized on the theory that the nature of a sexual favoritism
claim requires a different level of analysis than a "typical" hostile
environment claim. Critics will assert that since a plaintiff in a
sexual favoritism claim was not "directly" sexually harassed' 99
there is need for a heightened "widespread" standard to
eliminate frivolous suits. This criticism is unfounded based on
Supreme Court precedent and the EEOC's Sexual Discrimination
Guidelines that indicate so-called "indirect" sexual harassment
victims do not require a heightened standard if they are victims
of a hostile work environment.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on hostile work
environments does not appear to place any such limit on a claim
or require the plaintiff to be "directly" harassed.
Hostile
environment claims do not deal with quid pro quo situations
See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 178-79.
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
196 See Poole, supra note 9, at 843.
197 See EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, supra note 103 (providing no
workable criteria by which to determine what constitutes "widespread" versus
"isolated" favoritism).
198 See discussion supra Part III.
199See discussion supra Part V.C (arguing that sexual favoritism victims and
"direct" sexual harassment victims experience the same negative effects and are
both equally victims of sexual harassment).
194
195
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where the victim is propositioned for sex in exchange for job
benefits, which could be considered a true "direct" harassment
claim. 200 The goal of recognizing a hostile work environment
claim is to eliminate work environments where sex-based
hostility
"detract[s]
from
employees'
job
performance,
discourage[s] employees from remaining on the job or keep[s]
20 1
them from advancing in their careers."
The nature of a hostile work environment claim, as
recognized by the Supreme Court, embodies the Court's view of
Title VII's intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment. 20 2 Within this
broad "entire spectrum" and considering that Title VII is a
remedial statute, 20 3 it would seem that the Court would find
room for a hostile environment based on sexual favoritism if the
plaintiff was able to otherwise establish the elements of the
claim. 20 4 It is also interesting to note that the EEOC Guidelines
on Sex Discrimination (which are separate from the guidelines on
sexual favoritism) provide that an employee who is denied an
employment opportunity or benefit because his or her employer
grants that opportunity or benefit to another employee who
"subm[its] to the employer's sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors," may have a viable claim of unlawful sex
discrimination. 20 5 This indicates that the EEOC itself embraces
the possibility that an employer's actions regarding one employee
200

See King, supra note 67, at 540-41.

201 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).

202 See id. at 21.
203 See Manemann, supra note 57, at 664.
204 In Oncale, the Court found room in Title VII for a same-sex harassment
claim via a broader reading of the statute. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
205 See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(2004). In analyzing the treatment of a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim brought by an indirect victim, Manemann explained that:
[C]ourts have indicated that employees need not be targeted with sexual
harassment themselves to have a hostile environment claim of sex
discrimination, if the harassment is sufficiently pervasive. The use of this
'third party' hostile environment theory in situations of sexual harassment
is supported by other hostile environment claims under Title VII. In
addition, the EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination provide that a
qualified employee who is denied an employment opportunity or benefit
because his or her employer grants that opportunity or benefit to another
employee who 'submi[ts] to the employer's sexual advances or requests for
sexual favors' may have a viable claim of unlawful sex discrimination.
Manemann, supra note 57, at 653.
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can be the grounds for a Title VII claim on behalf of another
employee.
2.

The "Widespread" Favoritism Standard Is Appropriate
Because Title VII Is Not a Civility Standard

The Supreme Court itself has counseled that Title VII should
not be read as a "general civility code for the American
workplace." 20 6 Consensual sexual relationships in the workplace
are "inevitable" and are not automatically a violation of Title
VII. 20 7 The law does not require "asexuality nor androgyny in the
workplace" 20 8 and the Supreme Court has been careful to warn
that courts and juries are not to "mistake ordinary socializing in
the workplace" as sexual harassment. 20 9 The criticism of sexual
favoritism being deemed an actionable form of hostile
environment sexual harassment is that it will push Title VII
towards a civility code by requiring employees to remain
"asexual" in the workplace and employers to vigilantly police
personal relationships to ensure that they do not become liable
for sexual favoritism claims. 210
In order to avoid these
consequences, critics of using the Supreme Court's hostile
environment standard in instances of sexual favoritism will
likely insist that the higher "widespread favoritism" barrier is
required to ensure that employer and court responses to sexual
favoritism in the workplace do not convert Title VII into a civility
code.
This criticism fails to recognize that sexual favoritism, as an
actionable hostile environment sexual harassment claim under
the Supreme Court's standards, will not contort Title VII into a
civility code or require increased employer policing of intimate
relations. As with any conduct in the workplace, if sexual
favoritism impacts the workplace in ways that meet the
requirements of an actionable hostile environment, then the
206 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.

207 See Manemann, supra note 57, at 660.
208 Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 at 81.
209 Id.; see also Schultz, supra note 55, at 2090-94 (discussing the "sanitization"
of the workplace due to fears about sexual harassment claims).
210 See Buchanan, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that employers feel they are
assuming the role of "surrogate parents" to their employees); Chen & Sambur, supra
note 7, at 184-88 (discussing ways in which employers are trying to balance the
privacy of their employees with the employers' needs to avoid liability for sexual
harassment).
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plaintiff will be entitled to redress. Ensuring that employees are
protected from "direct" sexual harassment, as well as sexual
harassment via sexual favoritism, is consistent with Title VII
goals 2 11 and protects employees from a sexually charged hostile
working environment; it does not promise a civilized or sanitized
workplace. 2 12 Under the Supreme Court's standard, employers
are not required to increase monitoring of employee
relationships; they will just need to be prepared to take action on
claims that sexual favoritism has resulted in a hostile work
environment, which under current federal precedent has never
been deemed actionable. This has allowed employers to more or
less ignore the hostile environment and detrimental job impacts
created by a supervisor's sexual preferences. 2 13 Under the
Supreme Court's standard, employers will simply be required to
fold into their current sexual harassment training and protocols
the awareness that sexual favoritism in the workplace will not be
tolerated. This does not mean that consensual relationships will
not be tolerated; it just means that, like any other conduct, they
will not be tolerated if they rise to a level in which they create a
hostile work environment.
In contrast to the Supreme Court standard, the use of the
"widespread" favoritism standard may very well result in policing
of intimate relationships. One commentator has indicated that
the sexual favoritism standards urged by the EEOC (and
embraced by the Miller court) will create an increased policing
and monitoring of workplace relationships by both employers and
other employees. 214
For instance, under the "widespread"
favoritism standard, employers will need to closely monitor to
tally up the various ongoing consensual relationships and ensure
they don't approach the "widespread" marker. In addition, other
employees not involved in the relationship who feel they are
victims of favoritism and believe that they can only raise a valid
claim if the favoritism is "widespread" will devote time and
energy to monitoring these intimate relationships to determine if
211 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 156.
212 See Schultz, supra note 55, at 2090-94 (describing the sanitized workplace
created by fear of sexual harassment litigation).
213 See, e.g., Forst, supra note 7, at 31 (providing an overview of sexual
favoritism litigation and then asserting: "Employers and their attorneys need not
fear Title VII liability based merely on a consensual personal relationship (sexual or
otherwise) between a supervisor and subordinate.").
214 See Van Tol, supra note 3, at 179.
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they amount to the "widespread" level. Further, if employees
think that sexual favoritism will not be taken seriously unless it
is "widespread," this may have a deterrent effect on employee
reporting of sexual favoritism. Instead of reporting the behavior
to the employer in the first instance for resolution, employees
may wait until they believe that the favoritism has reached the
"widespread" level. Employers would prefer to be apprised of any
potential misconduct from the beginning, rather than at the
point where employees have deemed it "widespread."
Concerns about sexual favoritism in the workplace create
morale problems and resentment among workers; 215 thus, if an
environment of sexual favoritism is allowed to fester until the
non-favored employees deem it "widespread," it may damage the
work environment. Employers benefit from being able to manage
sexual harassment issues in the workplace immediately, 21 6 but
the "widespread" marker may result in unnecessary delay in
reporting problems to employers. Employers and employees both
benefit from a standard that simply includes sexual favoritism in
the gamut of what employers need to monitor to ensure they are
complying with Title VII's prohibition against hostile
environment sexual harassment, rather than attempting to
gauge sexual favoritism based upon the ambiguous "widespread"
standard. Use of the Supreme Court standard has the benefit of
focusing on a positive work environment, free from sexually
harassing behavior, rather than on a determination of
"widespread" versus "isolated." The Supreme Court standard is
also familiar to employers and their counsel and has likely driven
2 17
the employer's current sexual harassment monitoring protocol.
Use of this standard does not require any additional "policing" by
employers or any behavioral changes in the workplace beyond
the bounds of what is already prohibited under Title VII, and
thus does not pose the problem of impermissibly contorting Title
VII into a civility code.

215 Kathleen M. Hallinan, Note, Invasion of Privacyor ProtectionAgainst Sexual
Harassment: Co-Employee Dating and Employer Liability, 26 COLUM. JL. & Soc.
PROBS. 435, 436 (1993).
216 See
Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The
Employers' Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment-A
Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1578 (1999).
217 See id. at 1521 (noting that employers are paying increasing attention to
ways that they can decrease their liability for sexual harassment claims).
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CONCLUSION

Following the Supreme Court's standard for what constitutes
an actionable hostile work environment in sexual favoritism
cases considers and balances all of the relevant facts and
circumstances. In contrast, the Miller court's standard relies on
an ambiguous and hard to reach "widespread" favoritism
requirement.
The Supreme Court's standard for sexual
favoritism claims overcomes several barriers to Miller's current
analysis of sexual favoritism. The Miller "widespread" favoritism
standard ignores the actual harm to plaintiffs and instead
focuses on adding up enough instances of favoritism to determine
if they are "widespread" rather than "isolated." The "widespread"
favoritism standard combined with the egregious facts present in
Miller allow defendants to distinguish Miller and argue that
sexual favoritism does not exist in cases where the facts
presented are less outrageous. The Miller court did a disservice
to plaintiffs by ignoring the teachings of the Supreme Court and
inserting this "widespread" requirement into what a plaintiff
must prove in an actionable hostile work environment claim.
As the Miller court held, sexual favoritism creates an
actionable hostile work environment sexual harassment claim.
Sexual favoritism in the workplace creates an environment in
which victims are denied job benefits and feel their only way to
advance is through "sleeping their way to the top." A sexual
favoritism claim that meets the requirements of the Supreme
Court's hostile work environment standard should have grounds
for redress without facing the obstacles presented by Miller's
"widespread" favoritism standard.
In order to realistically
provide sexual favoritism victims with a means of relief, this
Comment urges future courts considering sexual favoritism
claims to look to the Supreme Court's hostile work environment
framework rather than analyzing the claim under the
problematic "widespread" favoritism standard embraced by the
Miller court.
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